"Philosophers are often like children.."(or perhaps not)

Wittgenstein notes: 'Philosophers are often like children, who first scribble random lines on a piece of paper with their pencils, and then ask an adult "what is that?"

This seems right, but perhaps more difficult to say exactly what W. intends. I interpret it to mean that philosophers too frequently ask "what is x?" type questions, but that the x is a phantom generated by their own philosophical language or by grammar. For example, the grammatical subject, the "I," leads to questions about what constitutes this "I", what is its content etc, questions that assume a thing corresponding  to the I (like a self). But perhaps this I is just a grammatical convenience, like the 'it' of 'it rains. And the child, similarly, assumes that something must correspond to its scribbles. Like certain types of philosopher, the child (Or Wittgenstein's child example) in thrall to this idea of correspondence or representation. 

But I wonder if that's quite right. When a child points to something he or she has drawn and asks, What is that? there's a recognition from the child that something has been made present, there is, from the child a kind of minimal surprise that creation has escaped them, that a "something" has emerged on the page which they could not have anticipated. The child has recognised something elementary about creation - that it results in an object, a texture, unfamiliar to our intention. That what confronts us on the page is something which contains a quantum of alienation. 

Anyway, my favourite example here is the child who's asked by the teacher what they've drawn  and replies "God". "But no one knows what God looks like," says the teacher, and the child replies "They do now."